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Rumination is a maladaptive coping style that has been found to be associated with several 
negative outcomes, including depression and anxiety. In particular, rumination has been 
found to be associated with deficits in inhibiting irrelevant information. This study examined 
the relationship of rumination to depression, anxiety, and stress and examined gender 
differences in these relationships. It also examined inhibitory deficits in rumination using a 
negative priming task with both short- and long-term components and evaluated the efficacy 
of a negative priming paradigm which utilised single presentations of stimuli that were not 
confounded by stimulus-response bindings. The results found that rumination was associated 
with higher levels of depression, anxiety, and stress, in line with the classification of 
rumination as maladaptive. It was also discovered that the predictors of rumination differed 
between males and females, with rumination being predicted by stress and depression for 
females and by anxiety for males, indicating possible gender differences in the explanation of 
rumination. The negative priming paradigm used in this study failed to produce any 
significant negative priming, and indeed produced significant positive priming meaning that 
no conclusions could be drawn from the data about inhibitory deficits and rumination. The 
results did however highlight the importance of the probe distractor in negative priming as it 
appears that a lack of competition between the probe distractor and the probe target may be a 
possible reason for the failure to observe negative priming. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview and Rationale  
Rumination is a style of coping that is characterised by persistent, recurring and 
intrusive thoughts about distress, and the causes and consequences of it (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999; Whitmer & Banich, 2007). It has 
been linked to multiple negative outcomes, particularly the onset of depression and the 
frequency and severity of depressive episodes (Johnston, Carter, & McLellan, 2011; Kuo et 
al., 2012; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Whitmer & Banich, 2007). In fact, research has 
indicated that inhibition, one of the main cognitive deficits associated with depression, is the 
result of rumination and not the depression itself, with the deficits found in depression 
disappearing when rumination is controlled for (De Lissnyder, Koster, Derakshan, & De 
Raedt, 2010; Whitmer & Banich, 2007). It has been further proposed that deficits in 
inhibition cause and maintain rumination, as well as facilitating the relationship between 
rumination and depression (De Lissnyder et al., 2010; Whitmer & Banich, 2007; Zetsche, 
D'Avanzato, & Joormann, 2012).   
The current study aims to further explore the relationship between rumination and its 
associated negative outcomes, particularly the observed inhibition deficits which will be 
examined in a non-depressed ruminator sample through the use of a negative priming 
paradigm. The following chapter provides details about rumination, its relationship to 
depression, and the emotional, physical, and cognitive outcomes associated with it. It also 
summarises existing research around negative priming and provides a more detailed account 




To ruminate is to have persistent, recurring and intrusive thoughts about the self, 
prompted by the experience of distress (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Trapnell & Campbell, 
1999; Whitmer & Banich, 2007). Ruminative thoughts tend to focus on the symptoms of 
distress and on the possible causes and consequences of it (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), for 
example thinking about how tired and unmotivated one feels and worrying that this will 
interfere with work (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). This differs from the negative 
automatic thoughts prevalent in depressive states in that rumination is a style of thought, a 
stable trait, whereas negative automatic thoughts are thoughts with negative content 
(Joormann, 2006). Importantly, ruminative thoughts are passive, that is, they do not lead to 
active problem solving or positive action to alleviate the distressed state and as such it is 
often classified as a maladaptive coping style (Johnston et al., 2011; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
2008). A ruminative response style has been shown to be associated with multiple negative 
outcomes in the emotional, social, physical and cognitive areas (Johnston et al., 2011; Kuo et 
al., 2012).  
A study carried out by Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1993) into what 
perpetuates rumination found that people who ruminate engage in less health-seeking 
behaviours, such as going to the doctors or engaging in pleasurable activities, even for those 
who believed they would enjoy themselves. Additionally, they found that people who 
ruminate believe that it is beneficial, in that it gives an enhanced sense of insight 
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993). The authors proposed that the belief around the 
benefits of rumination prevented ruminators from carrying out health-seeking behaviours so 
that they would not lose the insight they believed they gained and that rumination was 
subsequently maintained by the lack of positive reinforcement normally received from such 
behaviours (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993).  
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1.2.1 Emotional Outcomes 
 Rumination has been found to be predict several psychopathologies, including general 
anxiety and posttraumatic symptoms, binge eating and the related bulimia nervosa, binge 
drinking and the related alcohol abuse, and non-suicidal self-harm (Mor & Winquist, 2002; 
Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Watkins, 2008). However, rumination is most commonly, and 
most strongly, been found to be associated with the experience of Major Depressive Disorder 
(Kuo et al., 2012).  
 1.2.2 Rumination and Depression 
 Rumination has been shown to predict the onset of depression and the frequency and 
severity of depressive episodes (Johnston et al., 2011; Kuo et al., 2012; Nolen-Hoeksema et 
al., 2008; Whitmer & Banich, 2007). There is also some evidence that rumination can predict 
the duration of depressive episodes with those who ruminate experiencing longer episodes, 
though the evidence for this is not consistent (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Whitmer & 
Banich, 2007). For those with depression, rumination appears to increase the negative 
cognitive symptoms of depressive episodes, such as negative automatic thoughts and negative 
attentional biases, even after controlling for levels of depression (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
2008). Rumination has also been shown to have a negative impact on problem solving and 
health-seeking behaviour and may potentially lead to the loss of social support as ruminators 
have been found to be less well liked than non-ruminators (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).  
The relationship between rumination and depression is explained in the response 
styles theory (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). According to this theory, rumination increases the 
severity of depression and affects its onset and frequency through the increases it causes in 
negative cognitions and its negative impact on problem solving, health-seeking behaviours 
and social contact (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). These outcomes of rumination are proposed to 
increase the likelihood that depressive symptoms will result in an episode of Major 
4 
 
Depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). A review of the response styles theory carried out by 
Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2008) found that most tenets of the response styles theory were well 
supported. 
Rumination has also been found to mediate the gender difference that exists in the 
expression of Major Depressive Disorder (Johnson & Whisman, 2013; Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Jackson, 2001; Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson, & Grayson, 1999). Women are far more likely than 
men to both ruminate and become depressed, and it is this gender difference in rumination 
that is largely responsible for the gender difference seen in depression (Johnson & Whisman, 
2013; Nolen-Hoeksema & Jackson, 2001; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1999). A study evaluating 
the source of the gender difference in rumination found that women’s beliefs that negative 
emotions were more uncontrollable, that they were more responsible for the emotional tone 
of their relationships, and that they had less control over negative events than men fully 
mediated the relationship between gender and rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema & Jackson, 
2001).  Previous suggestions for the source of the gender difference, that women were more 
distressed and more emotionally expressive than men, were not upheld (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Jackson, 2001). 
1.2.3 Physical Outcomes 
In a meta-analysis carried out by Brosschot, Gerin, and Thayer (2006) rumination was 
shown to have a physical impact with the cardiovascular, endocrinological, immunological, 
and neurovisceral systems all showing an increase in activity. These increases have been 
found to be associated with greater utilization of the health care system and, in the case of the 
cardiovascular system could potentially result in increased mortality (Brosschot et al., 2006). 
This is hypothesised to be a result of rumination prolonging the duration of the experience of 
distress and creating a highly vigilant state, resulting in chronic physiological activation 
(Brosschot et al., 2006).  
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1.2.4 Cognitive Outcomes 
 As well as increasing the negative cognitions associated with depression, rumination 
also has an impact on several other aspects of cognitive functioning, particularly the 
executive functions (Johnston et al., 2011; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Rumination has 
been shown to interfere with people’s attention, concentration, and, as mentioned before, 
their ability to problem solve (Johnston et al., 2011; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). There is 
also evidence of rumination having an association with negative attentional and memory 
biases, task-switching deficits, deficits in updating working memory, and inhibition of 
irrelevant material (Beckwé, Deroost, Koster, De Lissnyder, & De Raedt, 2014; De Lissnyder 
et al., 2010; Joormann, 2006; Kuo et al., 2012; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Whitmer & 
Banich, 2007; Zetsche et al., 2012).  
Evidence for negative biases come from a study carried out by Kuo et al. (2012), who 
found that those high in rumination displayed significantly enhanced recall for negative 
words compared to neutral words. In support of this negative bias, fMRI studies have found 
that ruminators show greater activation of the amygdala, the area of the brain associated with 
negative affect, when responding to negative stimuli than non-ruminators (Ray et al., 2005; 
Siegle, Steinhauer, Thase, Stenger, & Carter, 2002). Studies have also shown that ruminators 
tend to recall more negative autobiographical memories than non-ruminators (Lyubomirsky, 
Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). Research carried out by De Lissnyder et al. (2010) 
suggests that these negative biases may be a result of deficits in cognitive control.  
Cognitive control refers to three distinct cognitive functions: (1) the ability to switch 
between tasks, operations or mental sets (set shifting); (2) monitoring and updating the 
contents of working memory; and (3) inhibition of distracting information (inhibition) (De 
Lissnyder et al., 2010). Several researchers have examined the relationship between 
rumination and set shifting, as demonstrated through task-switching paradigms in which the 
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time difference between making a switch between tasks and not making a switch is examined 
(Beckwé et al., 2014; De Lissnyder et al., 2010; Whitmer & Banich, 2007). A study by 
Beckwé et al. (2014) found that high ruminators displayed a set shifting deficit, demonstrated 
by having a higher switching cost for negative words which were processed in a self-
referential manner. Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) and De Lissnyder et al. (2010) also 
found that deficits in set shifting was associated with high rumination.  
The experiment carried out by Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) examined whether 
a ruminative coping style was associated cognitive inflexibility using the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test (Grant & Berg, 1948), a test which measures participants ability to alter their 
strategy based on feedback. The study found that ruminators committed significantly more 
perseverative errors than non-ruminators, that is, they continued to utilize a strategy despite 
feedback that it was no longer relevant, indicating a general set-shifting impairment (Davis & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000).  
De Lissnyder et al. (2010) investigated set-shifting impairments in response to 
emotional and non-emotional material in ruminators using the Affective Switch Task (AST), 
a switching task using emotional faces in which participants have to switch between 
identifying the faces on emotion, gender, or colour. The results of this study found that the 
participants who were high in rumination showed set shifting impairments, as indicated by a 
larger shift cost when having to alter their method of identifying the emotional faces, this 
result was found to be irrespective of the affect of the faces used (De Lissnyder et al., 2010). 
The above studies indicate that rumination is associated with deficits in set-switching, which 
may contribute to the stability of rumination, with ruminators being unable to “switch” to a 
more adaptive coping style.   
Interestingly, a study carried out by Whitmer and Banich (2007) found that set 
shifting deficits were only weakly related to rumination and that when inhibition was 
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controlled for the relationship disappeared, suggesting that set shifting deficits in ruminators 
may be a result of an inability to inhibit a previously relevant strategy rather than a deficit in 
the ability to switch between tasks. Further, the studies described above by De Lissnyder et 
al. (2010) and Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema (2000), in which they found set shifting deficits 
were related to rumination, also found that inhibitory deficits were strongly related to 
rumination, as indicated by difficulties that the high ruminators had in inhibiting the 
previously relevant strategy. The De Lissnyder et al. (2010) article found that this inhibitory 
deficit was related to affect with deficits being found only for the negative faces. 
1.3 Inhibition 
Cognitive inhibition is the ability to update the contents of working memory by 
removing no longer relevant material and to effectively inhibit the input of irrelevant 
distracting information into working memory (De Lissnyder et al., 2010; Joormann, 2006). 
Therefore, inhibition is necessary for a range of cognitive tasks, including concentration, 
attention, memory and problem solving (Joormann, 2006), leading some researchers to 
propose that cognitive deficits shown in these areas are a result of an overarching inhibitory 
deficit (De Lissnyder et al., 2010; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). In fact, it has been proposed 
by several researchers that rumination itself is caused and maintained by impaired cognitive 
inhibition (Hester & Garavan, 2005; Ursin, 2005; Watkins & Brown, 2002; Zetsche et al., 
2012). It has also been proposed that inhibitory deficits may facilitate the relationship 
between rumination and depression (De Lissnyder et al., 2010; Whitmer & Banich, 2007; 
Zetsche et al., 2012). As such, much research has been conducted into the relationship 
between rumination and inhibition.  
Research carried out by Joormann and Gotlib (2008) investigated the relationship 
between depression, rumination and deficits in the ability to update the contents of working 
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memory. In this experiment participants were first shown two lists of three words of either 
positive or negative affect, which they were to memorise, and were then subsequently told to 
ignore one of them. Their decision latencies were then recorded on a recognition task in 
which the participants were shown a word and asked to decide whether that word came from 
the relevant list (Joormann & Gotlib, 2008).  The results of this experiment found that 
participants with depression showed greater decision latencies to irrelevant words of negative 
affect than the controls, indicating difficulties removing negative information from working 
memory (Joormann & Gotlib, 2008). These results were found to be highly correlated with 
rumination, even after levels of depression were statistically controlled for, suggesting that 
rumination is associated with impairments in removing negative irrelevant material from 
working memory, an impairment which is associated with an inhibitory deficit (Joormann & 
Gotlib, 2008). 
Evidence of an inhibitory deficit associated with rumination also comes from a study 
by Zetsche et al. (2012) in which participants completed a modified Working Memory 
Selection Task to assess differences in the ability to inhibit no longer relevant information 
from working memory. In the Working Memory Selection Task participants are asked to 
memorise six words, they are then shown three of these words again and are instructed to 
forget them, finally a single word is presented and participants are asked to decide whether it 
is one of the three words they were to remember (Zetsche et al., 2012), an experiment similar 
to that carried out by (Joormann & Gotlib, 2008). The results of this experiment found that 
rumination was associated with impairments in removing no longer relevant information 
from working memory, an inhibitory dysfunction, and that this impairment predicted higher 
levels of rumination (Zetsche et al., 2012). This experiment also examined deficits in the 
ability to control the access to working memory in the first place, finding that this ability was 
not related to rumination. From these results Zetsche et al. (2012) suggests that high 
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ruminators and low ruminators differ in their likelihood to persevere with ruminative 
thoughts, due to an inhibitory deficit, and not in their likelihood of initiating negative 
ruminative thoughts.  
Inhibitory deficits were also found for ruminators using a random number generation 
task, in which participants were asked to say the numbers one to nine in random order 100 
times (Watkins & Brown, 2002). The results of this study found that depressive ruminations 
displayed less randomness in their number generation, indicating a deficit in inhibiting the 
habitual counting response (Watkins & Brown, 2002). The authors suggest that deficits in 
inhibition arise from competition for processing capacity, proposing that ruminators are 
already using much of their processing capacity with their ruminative thoughts, not leaving 
enough capacity for the inhibition of the other material and thus causing the observed deficits 
(Watkins & Brown, 2002). 
Support for an inhibitory deficit associated with rumination also comes from fMRI 
results in a study carried out by Berman et al. (2011), which consisted of both an 
experimental component and an fMRI component. The experimental component utilised a 
directed forgetting task, similar to those carried out Joormann and Gotlib (2008) and Zetsche 
et al. (2012), the results of which showed that ruminators had significantly more difficulties 
removing negative words from short-term memory than non-ruminators, and that as 
rumination increased so did the level of difficulty (Berman et al., 2011). The fMRI results 
from this study support the experimental results in that ruminators exhibited significantly 
greater variance of activation in the left inferior frontal gyrus, an area that is associated with 
inhibiting irrelevant material, than non-ruminators, with ruminators showing a more diffuse 
pattern of activation, particularly for the negative affective words used (Berman et al., 2011).  
Finally, a study carried out by Joormann (2006)  examined deficits in inhibition using 
an affective negative priming task in which participants had to inhibit one word while 
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deciding if a target word was self-referential. This target word was either positive or negative 
in affect and in some trials was the word they had ignored in the previous trial. The study 
found that participants who scored low in rumination responded slower to both positive and 
negative words that they had been shown previously, signifying that inhibition of that word 
had occurred. However, participants who scored high in rumination exhibited no slowed 
responding for words that they had been shown before, indicating a deficit in inhibition, a 
result that was found to not be mediated by level of depression or the affect of the words 
(Joormann, 2006). This experiment was a follow-up to an earlier negative priming 
experiment which examined the relationship between depression and inhibition (Joormann, 
2004). The results of this study found an inhibitory deficit for negative information in those 
with depression, as evidenced by a failure to produce slowed responding to repeated words 
compared with controls, a result that was found to be related to rumination and not depression 
in the subsequent study (Joormann, 2004, 2006). The article carried out by Joormann (2006) 
appears to be the only research to examine the relationship between rumination and inhibition 
using a negative priming paradigm.  
1.4 Negative Priming 
As described above, there are several methods that have the potential to directly test 
the degree of inhibitory functioning and measure individual differences. Of these designs, 
negative priming (Neill, Valdes, & Terry, 1995; Tipper, 1985) is commonly used while 
researching inhibition in depressed or dysphoric populations as it can quantify the strength of 
the inhibitory processes and allows for comparisons between different affective stimuli 
(Joormann, 2006). This makes negative priming an appropriate method for measuring 
inhibitory deficits in rumination. It also easily accommodates the use of verbal stimuli which 
is appropriate due to the verbal nature of ruminative thoughts (Beckwé et al., 2014). The 
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negative priming effect is defined as the reaction time difference between trials in which an 
ignored word subsequently becomes the target word (ignored repetition trials) and trials in 
which the ignored word is unrelated to the subsequent target word (unrelated control trials) 
(Henson, Eckstein, Waszak, Frings, & Horner, 2014; Joormann, 2006; Mayr & Buchner, 
2007). The negative priming effect is typically displayed with a slowing of response time 
and/or more error-prone reactions for ignored repetition trials (Henson et al., 2014; Mayr & 
Buchner, 2007). 
Typically negative priming experiments consist of a pair of trials, a prime trial and a 
probe trial (Christie & Klein, 2008; Joormann, 2004). In each trial a pair of stimuli 
(frequently words) are presented, one serving as a distractor, which participants are instructed 
to ignore, and one serving as a target, which participants are instructed to respond to 
(Joormann, 2004; Kramer & Strayer, 2001). The critical condition in negative priming is the 
ignored repetition condition in which the prime distractor, which was ignored, becomes the 
probe target, which is to be responded to (Christie & Klein, 2008; Grison & Strayer, 2001). 
As stated above, the negative priming effect is assessed by comparing the reaction times or 
error rates for the ignored repetition trials to the reaction times or error rates for the unrelated 
control condition trials, in which the prime distractor and probe target are unrelated to one 
another (Christie & Klein, 2008).  Importantly, research has shown that the negative priming 
effect only occurs when participants are unaware of the ignored repetition condition, that is 
that they do not notice that prime distractors sometimes become probe targets, and when 
there is a probe distractor accompanying the probe target that is similar enough that they 
cannot be easily distinguished (Mayr & Buchner, 2007; Moore, 1994). In experimental 
conditions where participants can detect the relationship between prime distractors and probe 
targets or where the probe target is easily distinguished from the probe distractor negative 
priming does not occur and, indeed a facilitatory effect is often seen, as displayed by faster 
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responding to ignored repetition trials or positive priming (Mayr & Buchner, 2007; Moore, 
1994).  
The negative priming effect has been shown to particularly robust, having been 
observed with a range of populations, including older adults (Gamboz, Russo, & Fox, 2002), 
children (Pritchard & Neumann, 2004), schizophrenics (Moritz, Jacobsen, Mersmann, Kloss, 
& Andresen, 2000; Zabal & Buchner, 2006), and with a range of stimuli, including letters 
(Tipper & Cranston, 1985), words (Joormann, 2004), pictorial objects (Tipper, 1985), and 
even auditory stimuli (Banks, Roberts, & Ciranni, 1995; Zabal & Buchner, 2006). Negative 
priming has even been observed when the stimuli change modalities from prime to probe 
trial, for example from auditory to visual and vice versa (Buchner, Zabal, & Mayr, 2003; 
Driver & Baylis, 1993) and with a range of response types, such as naming (Grison & 
Strayer, 2001), localisation (Tipper, Brehaut, & Driver, 1990), and categorisation (Neumann, 
McCloskey, & Felio, 1999).   
1.4.1 Theories of Negative Priming 
The mechanisms through which negative priming occurs is a subject of much debate 
(Mayr & Buchner, 2007; Neumann et al., 1999; Tipper, 2001). At present there are two 
prevailing theories that strive to explain this effect; the distractor inhibition model (Houghton 
& Tipper, 1994; Tipper, 1985) and the episodic retrieval model (Neill & Valdes, 1992; Neill, 
Valdes, Terry, & Gorfein, 1992). 
The distractor inhibition model posits that target information is enhanced through 
excitatory mechanisms while distractor information is simultaneously suppressed by an 
inhibitory mechanism, a theory which stems from the dual-process models of attention 
(Neumann et al., 1999; Tipper, 2001). This model holds that the negative priming effect is a 
result of the inhibitory mechanism, advancing that when a irrelevant distractor item is 
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presented it is actively inhibited to the degree that when the item becomes task relevant the 
processing of it continues to be impaired (Mayr & Buchner, 2007; Tipper, 2001).  
The episodic retrieval model rejects the account that the inhibitory mechanism is 
responsible for negative priming and posits instead that it is the result of a retrieval 
mechanism (Mayr & Buchner, 2007; Neumann et al., 1999). According to this model, when 
an item is presented it cues the retrieval of previous episodes involving the same item to 
facilitate recognition. These previous episodes include information about the response that 
was made to that item, for example a distractor item would be associated with a “do not 
respond” tag (Tipper, 2001). In the case of negative priming, the probe target item cues the 
retrieval of the previously shown prime distractor and the “do not respond” tag, as there is a 
conflict between the response required for the probe and the items response tag the response 
to the probe is impaired, creating the negative priming effect (Mayr & Buchner, 2007). 
While much research has been carried out on the two different models there is no 
definitive evidence for the accuracy of one model over the other (Mayr & Buchner, 2007; 
Tipper, 2001), largely because one of the difficulties in researching the two models is that 
they generally make the same predictions for negative priming outcomes (Neumann et al., 
1999). An exception to this is in experiments that examine spreading activation, in which an 
underlying semantic network activates not only the item seen in the experiment but also 
related items (Mayr & Buchner, 2007). According to the distractor inhibition model 
inhibition can also spread, for example an ignored picture of a cat can cause a response delay 
to a picture of a dog, as shown in the original negative priming experiment carried out by 
Tipper (1985). This is different from the episodic retrieval model in which specific instances 
are retrieved, for example the item cat would activate a previous instance of a cat being 
shown and nothing else (Mayr & Buchner, 2007). Therefore, instances of negative priming as 
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a result of spreading inhibition support the distractor inhibition model and not the episodic 
retrieval model. 
 Spreading inhibition was researched in a cross-language priming study carried out by 
Neumann et al. (1999). This study consisted of two experiments, one unilingual (English) and 
one bilingual (English-Spanish), in which participants were required to name the target word 
aloud for the prime trial and then make a lexical decision about whether the probe target word 
was an actual word, in English for the first experiment and in Spanish for the second 
(Neumann et al., 1999). For both experiments, the target and distractor words were displayed 
one above the other with the target word being in lowercase letters and the distractor word in 
uppercase letters. The prime display was presented either centred on the screen or offset to 
the left or right slightly, while the probe display was always centred on the screen. The two 
experiments differed only in the language used for the probe target, English for the first 
experiment and Spanish for the second.  For the ignored repetition trials of the second 
experiment the probe targets were the Spanish translations of the previously shown prime 
distractors. The two models make identical predictions for the outcome of the first 
experiment, that there will be a negative priming effect; however for the second experiment 
the predictions the models make are entirely different. For the second experiment the 
distractor inhibition model predicts that there will be negative priming due to spreading 
inhibition from the English words to the Spanish words. The episodic retrieval model predicts 
that there will no negative priming as the specific probe target used has never been seen 
before (Neumann et al., 1999). The results of this study support the distractor inhibition 
model with significant negative priming effects being observed for both the unilingual 
Experiment 1 and the bilingual Experiment 2, indicating spreading inhibition (Neumann et 
al., 1999).  
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Alternative evidence that inhibition occurs with salient but distracting stimuli comes 
from a neurophysiological measure of suppression (Gaspar & McDonald, 2014) in which 
event-related potentials are measured in the brain to see if ignoring a salient (eye-catching) 
distractor and attending to a target was the result of suppressing or inhibiting the distractor or 
of increasing the priority or activation of the target.  The results showed that during a 
searching task the salient distractor elicited an electrophysiological suppression response that 
minimised the impact of the distractor on subsequent stages of processing (Gaspar & 
McDonald, 2014), a result very similar to what is proposed to occur during negative priming 
according to the distractor inhibition model (Grison, Tipper, & Hewitt, 2005; Tipper, 2001). 
The main evidence for the episodic retrieval model comes from negative priming 
studies in which in the interval between the participant’s response and the presentation of the 
next stimulus, the response-to-stimulus interval, is manipulated (Mayr & Buchner, 2007). 
Neill and Valdes (1992) discovered that when the response-to-stimulus interval was varied 
that the size of the negative priming effect was dependent not only on the size of the interval 
between prime and probe but also on the ratio of this interval to the preceding response-to-
stimulus interval. This finding indicates that large priming effects should be found for trials 
with a short response-to-stimulus interval when they are preceded by trials with a long 
response-to-stimulus interval and little or no priming effects should be found when a trial 
with long response-to-stimulus interval is preceded by a trial with a short one (Mayr & 
Buchner, 2007). The results from the follow-up study carried out by Neill et al. (1992) 
support this claim with the largest priming effects being found when the response-to-stimulus 
intervals went from 4000ms to 500ms and the smallest when the intervals went from 500ms 
to 4000ms. This is a result that cannot be fully explained by the distractor inhibition model 
where negative priming should only depend on the response-to-stimulus interval between 
prime and probe (Mayr & Buchner, 2007). 
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Further evidence for the episodic retrieval model comes from studies which varied the 
contextual similarities between the prime and the probe and found that priming was greater 
when the prime and probe were more contextually similar (Fox & De Fockert, 1998; Mayr & 
Buchner, 2007). For example, Fox and De Fockert (1998) varied the intensities of the prime 
and probe targets, making them either bright or dim, and found that the priming effect was 
larger when the intensities matched, i.e. when both the prime and the probe were either bright 
or dim. This is held as evidence for the episodic retrieval model as priming was greater when 
participants were shown identical probes to the prime they were just shown, suggesting that 
they were retrieving specific target representations (Mayr & Buchner, 2007). However, it is 
important to note that a trend towards negative priming was still found in trials were the 
intensity of the prime and probe were changed, i.e. going from bright to dim or vice versa, 
indicating that some spreading activation was occurring (Fox & De Fockert, 1998), an event 
that is best explained by the distractor inhibition model.  
It has been pointed out that the main difference between the two models is the 
temporal direction of the effect, with the distractor inhibition model acting from prime to 
probe, forward in time, and the episodic retrieval model acting from probe to prime, back in 
time (Neill et al., 1995). In light of this, it was put forward by Tipper (2001) that the two 
models differ only in the emphasis that they place on the sequence of the process, i.e. 
forward-acting (encoding) versus backward-acting (retrieving), and that, though they have 
been treated as such, the two theories are not mutually exclusive. He suggests that an 
integrated model of negative priming may be more accurate in which there is an episodic 
retrieval of prior inhibitory states (Tipper, 2001). Indeed, the author suggests that this 
integrated model can better explain those aspects of priming that have previously been used 
as evidence for the episodic retrieval model, such as negative priming found when the 
response-to-stimulus intervals and contextual similarities were varied (Tipper, 2001). Tipper 
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(2001) believes that this model is particularly important in explaining the existence of long-
term priming, that the long delays between the display of the prime and the probe require 
both retrieval and inhibition.   
Evidence of long-term priming has been found in several studies with delays ranging 
anywhere from seven seconds to one month (DeSchepper & Treisman, 1996; Grison et al., 
2005; Tipper, Weaver, Cameron, Brehaut, & Bastedo, 1991). Tipper et al. (1991) showed that 
inhibition could last at least seven seconds after the display of the prime and that this was 
unaffected by intervening trials, using both identification and location tasks. Negative 
priming from novel shapes was found by DeSchepper and Treisman (1996), lasting across 
200 intervening trials and with delays of up to a month, even without explicit memory of 
shapes ever being presented. Interestingly, this research found individual differences in 
priming with only those producing negative priming in the short-term producing it in the 
long-term. In fact, those participants who failed to produce priming at short intervals but still 
successfully ignored the prime distractor showed increased facilitation over time 
(DeSchepper & Treisman, 1996). Long-term Negative priming was also found across all 
participants after a delay of three minutes and with 56 intervening displays in a study carried 
out by Grison et al. (2005) using meaningful face and object stimuli. The three studies 
described above provide evidence for the existence of long-term priming, suggesting that 
memory traces can be formed even for irrelevant information and that these traces can effect 
behaviour over time (Grison et al., 2005).  
All three teams of researchers agreed that the existence of long-term negative priming 
effects were likely due to long-term inhibitory traces being established on internal 
representations of distractors items and then retrieved as a result of contextual cues 
(DeSchepper & Treisman, 1996; Grison et al., 2005; Tipper et al., 1991). Their suggestion 
fits with the proposal by Tipper (2001) that the episodic retrieval of prior inhibitory states 
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occurs in negative priming.  Indeed, the proposal by Tipper (2001) can also account for the 
individual differences identified by DeSchepper and Treisman (1996) between those who 
showed negative priming and those who do not, which cannot be explained by transient 
inhibition (distractor inhibition), which would not last for a month or through intervening 
trials, or by response tags (episodic retrieval), as items labelled with a “do not respond” tag 
would not result in facilitated responding (Grison et al., 2005) 
 1.4.2 Stimulus-Response Bindings 
The integrated model proposed by Tipper (2001) implies that inhibitory and retrieval 
processes cannot be separated when explaining negative priming results, however a recent 
study carried out by Henson et al. (2014) suggested that the retrieval of response tags, which 
he called stimulus-response bindings, could be controlled for, meaning that any priming 
results found would be the result of inhibition. He stated that the results from negative 
priming experiments are confounded by the activation of stimulus-response bindings, making 
it difficult to ascertain whether negative priming effects are the result of inhibition or the 
result of the bindings (Henson et al., 2014). This makes it necessary to control for stimulus-
response bindings when carrying out negative priming research in order to obtain a true 
measure of the negative priming effect.  As such, Henson et al. (2014) recommended using 
different tasks for the prime and probe trials, suggesting that a naming task be used for one 
trial type and a classification task being used for the other, this would mean that the response 
tag for the prime distractor would not be in conflict with the response needed for the probe 
target as the action required is completely different. This is a method that has already been 
used successfully in the experiments carried out by Neumann et al. (1999), in which the 
participants named the prime target and then carried out a lexical decision (word or not a 
word) for the probe target. This further suggests that the results from the Neumann et al. 
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(1999) study can be attributed to the inhibitory mechanism, as stimulus-response bindings 
were controlled for.  
1.4.3 Stimulus Repetition  
Another area of debate in the realm of negative priming research has been whether 
negative priming can occur with only single presentations of a prime or whether multiple 
presentations are required (Mayr & Buchner, 2007). Malley and Strayer (1995) found 
negative priming effects when the stimuli were drawn from a limited pool of only 16 items 
and each word was frequently repeated but failed to find any negative priming effects when a 
large pool of stimuli was used with each item appearing only once. Grison and Strayer (2001) 
also found that negative priming was contingent upon stimulus repetition and Kramer and 
Strayer (2001) found that negative priming effects increased in magnitude with the repetition 
in stimuli. From this it was concluded that distractors are only inhibited if they are highly 
activated stimulus representations as stimulus representations with only a low activation level 
are not likely to interfere with responding and therefore do not need to be inhibited (Mayr & 
Buchner, 2007). However, several researchers have found that negative priming can occur 
after only a single presentation of a stimulus.  
The experiment carried out by Grison et al. (2005), which found long-term negative 
priming after a delay of three minutes, used experimentally novel stimuli consisting of 
pictures of faces and objects that were presented only once. The long-term negative priming 
experiment carried out by DeSchepper and Treisman (1996) also used stimuli that were 
presented only once, in this case using shapes that were completely novel having been 
developed for the experiment. That the two long-term negative priming experiments used 
novel stimuli indicate that priming from a single presentation is not only possible but is 
incredibly robust (Mayr & Buchner, 2007). Further, the cross-language negative priming 
experiment by Neumann et al. (1999), which found both unilingual and bilingual negative 
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priming, used only singularly presented stimuli as well. These results call into question the 
conclusion that only highly activated distractors resulting from stimulus repetition can 
produce negative priming effects.  
1.5 The Current Study 
The current study aims to add to the literature on rumination and the negative 
emotional and cognitive outcomes it is associated with and will consist of two parts. The first 
part will explore the relationship between rumination and the negative emotional outcomes 
that have been identified in the literature, specifically depression, anxiety, and stress. It will 
also examine any influence that gender may have on these relationships. It will do this 
through the use of three different surveys, the first which measures rumination, the second 
which measures depression, anxiety, and stress, and the third which measures demographic 
characteristics such as gender. The second part of the study will explore the relationship 
between rumination and inhibition through the use of a negative priming task in which the 
priming effects of high ruminators and low ruminators are compared.  
The negative priming paradigm used in this study is adapted from the Neumann et al. 
(1999) method which used a naming task for the prime and a lexical decision task for the 
probe trials, in line with the recommendation of Henson et al. (2014) for identifying true 
priming effects not confounded by stimulus-response bindings. The priming task will use 
words that are positive, negative, or neutral in affect and will have two conditions, the 
ignored repetition condition, in which the distractor becomes the target, and the unrelated 
control condition, in which the distractor and target are unrelated. The priming paradigm will 
also have some long-term priming trials as there appears to be no research examining long-
term inhibitory effects in ruminators. Response times will be recorded and compared across 
conditions and across the participant groups. 
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The second part of the study also aims to add to the current literature in the area of 
negative priming around the methods necessary for the successful measurement of the 
negative priming effect. It will further examine the existence of priming effects with only 
single presentations of stimuli and will provide a measure of the priming effect that is not 
confounded by stimulus-response bindings.  
The previous research described above has led to the formation of two hypotheses for 
the first part of the study. First, that rumination will be associated with higher levels of 
depression and anxiety, and second, that gender will mediate the relationship between 
rumination and depression. The previous research also led to the formation of three 
hypotheses for the second part of the study. Firstly, that high ruminators will show decreased 
negative priming compared with low ruminators as a result of an inhibitory deficit, as was 
discovered in the negative priming experiment of Joormann (2006). Secondly, that this 
reduction in negative priming will be greater when the ignored distractor is a negative word 
than when it is positive or neutral in affect, suggesting negative biases. Thirdly, that high 
ruminators will also show decreased long-term negative priming compared with low 
ruminators. A further two hypotheses pertain to the effectiveness of the negative priming 
method used. The first hypothesis is that the negative priming method used in this study will 
exhibit a negative priming effect, just as the Neumann et al. (1999) priming study did, and the 




CHAPTER 2: METHOD I – QUESTIONNAIRES  
2.1. Participants 
 Participants were recruited from amongst the students at the University of Canterbury 
from July to November 2014 via the university email system and university social media 
pages. A chance to win one of two $50 shopping mall vouchers was provided as an incentive 
to complete the survey. A total of 371 surveys were completed during that time with 290 
being completed to the extent that they could be analysed. The participants included 79 males 
and 195 females with an average age was 23.88 (SD = 6.57).  Informed consent was gained 
for each participant and permission to contact them for possible further participation was 
queried.  The study itself and the surveys used were approved by the University of 
Canterbury Human Ethics Committee (Appendix A).   
2.2 Measures 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS)(Lovibond & Lovibond, 1993). The DASS 
(Appendix B) is a 42-item questionnaire that contains three self-report scales measuring 
current (“over the past week”) symptoms of depression, anxiety, and stress.  The DASS has 
been found to be a reliable measure with excellent internal consistencies (Antony, Bieling, 
Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998; Clara, Cox, & Enns, 2001; Crawford & Henry, 2003; Page, 
Hooke, & Morrison, 2007) and favourable temporal stability (Brown, Chorpita, Korotitsch, & 
Barlow, 1997; Page et al., 2007). It has also been shown to have good construct and 
discriminant validity (Antony et al., 1998; Brown et al., 1997; Crawford & Henry, 2003; 
Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), as well as convergent validity which is superior to other 
scales, including the commonly used and well-validated Beck Depression Inventory and Beck 
Anxiety Inventory (Brown et al., 1997; Crawford & Henry, 2003; Lovibond & Lovibond, 
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1995). The DASS was developed using, and normed on, non-clinical samples consisting 
predominately of Australian university students (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) making it an 
appropriate measure to use with this population. 
Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ) (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). The RRQ 
(Appendix C) is a 24-item questionnaire that contains two scales, one assessing self-
rumination and the other assessing self-reflection. This questionnaire defines rumination as 
recurrent thinking about the self, prompted by threats, losses, or injustices to the self 
(Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). It defines reflection as thinking about the self, motivated not 
by distress but by curiosity (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). It has been shown to have good 
psychometric properties with excellent construct validity, convergent validity and internal 
consistency (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Similar reliability and validity have been 
demonstrated with a Japanese version of the scale (Takano & Tanno, 2009).  
Demographic Questions. Participants were asked several demographic questions 
relating to their age, gender, university major, and whether or not they had ever been 
diagnosed with depression or another mental illness. They were also asked if they consented 
to being contacted for possible participation in the negative priming experiment, as well as a 
screening question relating to this.  
2.3 Procedure 
The recruitment blurb emailed to students and posted on social media pages contained 
a link to the survey website Qualtrics, on which all the questionnaires were run. Participants 
first read an information page and then filled out an online consent form. The participants 
filled out the DASS first, then the RRQ, and finally answered the demographic and follow-up 
experiment questions. For the DASS, participants were instructed to rate how much the 42 
items applied to them over the past week on a four-point Likert scale from 0 (did not apply to 
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me at all) to 3 (applied to me very much, or most of the time). For the RRQ, participants were 
instructed to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with the 24 items on a five-
point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Results were then scored 
and those participants who received DASS scores of above 20 on the depression scale 
(severe) were contacted via phone to inform them of their results and suggest that they talk to 
their General Practitioner or a mental health professional, with an option also being given for 
at-risk participants to talk to a supervising clinical psychologist.  
2.4 Data Analysis 
 This study assessed the relationship between rumination, depression, and gender using 
a hierarchical multiple regression in which the ability of rumination to predict depression was 
assessed, after controlling for gender. A standard multiple regression was also performed to 
assess the predictors of rumination, with rumination as the dependent variable and 
depression, anxiety, and stress as the predictor/independent variables. Two follow-up 
multiple regressions were performed for both the depression and the rumination regressions 
using the same variables, one with the female participants data and one with the male 
participants data.  
The data was then split into two groups, high and low ruminators, with the differences 
between the two groups being examined on rumination, depression, anxiety, stress, age, and 
gender using a Mann Whitney-U test. Where significant results were obtained effect sizes 
were calculated using Cohen’s d (d = r/√N) where a small effect size is 0.2, a medium effect 
size is 0.5, and a large effect size is 0.8, according to the guidelines laid out by Cohen (1988). 
 Before the analyses were carried out all relevant variables were examined for 
normality by performing visual checks of histograms and normality plots and by examining 
the skewness and kurtosis values to ensure that the appropriate test was being used. Other 
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assumptions of the relevant tests were checked statistically. Participants with missing data 




CHAPTER 3: RESULTS I – QUESTIONNAIRES  
3.1 Distribution of Test Variables 
 The distributions of the rumination, depression, anxiety, and stress variables for the 
whole sample are presented in Appendix D, as is the distribution of gender. The skewness 
and kurtosis values are presented in Appendix E. The distribution of the rumination variable 
was approximately normal with a skewness value of -0.514 and a kurtosis value of -0.209. 
The remaining variables all had slight floor effects but were skewed in the same direction, a 
result that is expected due to the nature of the variables and the large sample size and does 
not violate assumptions of normality. 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 Descriptive statistics were calculated for each variable and are presented in Table 1 
for the whole sample and for the male and female participants separately. The participants of 
this study had a mean of 3.46 (SD = 0.84) for rumination and a mean of 3.37 (SD = 0.73) for 
reflection, with the maximum average possible being five, this is similar to the averages 
found by the developers of the Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire in their original study 
(Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). The mean levels of rumination and reflection for males and for 
females were also similar to this. The average depression, anxiety, and stress scores for the 
whole sample were 6.52 (SD = 7.48), 5.09 (SD = 5.09), and 10.11 (SD = 7.13), respectively, 
out of a maximum of 42. These averages are similar to the Australian norms provided in the 
manual for the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS) (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1993). The 
male and female participants differed slightly on their mean scores with the males displaying 
higher mean levels of depression and slightly higher mean levels of anxiety and stress.  
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The manual for the DASS also provides severity categories ranging from normal to 
extremely severe (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1993) and the participants of this study were 
categorised according to their guidelines (Table 2). For depression, 77.6% (N = 225) of the 
participants were in the normal category, 8.3% were considered mild, 7.9% were moderate, 
3.1% were severe and 3.1% (N = 9) were in the extremely severe category. For anxiety and 
stress the picture was similar with 75.9% and 79.3% respectively in the normal category. 
Males and females differed slightly in their severity categorisations with males showing 
greater percentages in the more severe categories for both depression and anxiety.  
Based on the differences observed for males and females on the depression, anxiety, 
and stress scales independent means t-tests were carried out to examine any gender 
differences. The assumptions of a t-test, normality, homogeneity of variance and 
independence of observation, were examined and no violations were found. The results 
revealed no significant differences between the genders on any measure (all t < 1, ns), 
including rumination, reflection, depression, anxiety, stress, and age.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for whole sample and female and male participants 
Variable Whole sample Females Males 
 N Mean (SD) N Mean (SD) N Mean (SD) 
Rumination 280 3.46 (0.84) 161 3.45 (0.813) 64 3.44 (0.964) 
Reflection 274 3.37 (0.73) 160 3.30 (0.698) 63 3.33 (0.781) 
Depression 290 6.52 (7.48) 165 5.65 (6.497) 67 7.67 (9.199) 
Anxiety 290 5.09 (5.09) 165 4.78 (4.797) 67 5.33 (5.327) 
Stress 290 10.11 (7.13) 165 9.76 (7.173) 67 10.03 (6.893) 





Table 2: Categorisation of DASS-42 scores for whole sample, and female and male 
participants 
Variable Category Whole Sample Females  Males 
Depression Normal 225 (77.6%) 132 (80%) 52 (77.6%) 
Mild 24 (8.3%) 15 (9.1%) 3 (4.5%) 
Moderate 23 (7.9%) 12 (7.3%) 5 (7.5%) 
Severe 9 (3.1%) 3 (1.8 %) 3 (4.4%) 
Extremely Severe 9 (3.1%) 3 (1.8 %) 4 (6%) 
Anxiety Normal 220 (75.9%) 124 (75.2 %) 53 (79.1%) 
Mild 22 (7.5%) 14 (8.4%) 2 (3%) 
Moderate 30 (10.4%) 19 (11.6%) 6 (8.9%) 
Severe 11 (3.8%) 5 (3%) 4 (6%) 
Extremely Severe 7 (2.4%) 3 (1.8%) 2 (3%) 
Stress Normal 230 (79.3%) 127 (77%) 55 (82.1%) 
Mild 26 (9.0%) 18 (10.9%) 4 (6%) 
Moderate 22 (7.6%) 13 (7.9%) 6 (8.9%) 
Severe 10 (3.4%) 7 (4.2%) 1 (1.5%) 
Extremely Severe 2 (0.7%) 0 (0%) 1 (1.5%) 
 
3.3 Predictors of Rumination 
 Bivariate correlations were performed on the variables of interest to examine the 
relationship between rumination, depression and the other variables measured. The 
correlations of rumination and depression with age, reflection, and previous incidences of 
mental illness all failed to reach significance (all r < 0.1, ns.) and so these variables were not 
included in any analyses. The relationship between rumination and depression was significant 
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(r (262) = 0.393, p < 0.001), as was ruminations relationship with anxiety (r (262) = 0.401, p 
< 0.001) and stress (r (262) = 0.450, p < 0.001). Depression was also significantly correlated 
with anxiety (r (262) = 0.516, p < 0.001) and stress (r (262) = 0.628, p < 0.001). These 
correlations are presented in Table 3, as are the correlations between gender, rumination and 
depression, although these were not significant. 
Table 3: Bivariate correlations between rumination, depression, and other variables of interest 
(Pearson r; sig. 2-tailed) 
Variable N Rumination Depression 
Rumination 262 r = 1.000 r = 0.393 (p < 0.001) 
Depression 262 r = 0.393 (p < 0.001) r = 1.000 
Anxiety 262 r = 0.401 (p < 0.001) r = 0.516 (p < 0.001) 
Stress 262 r = 0.450 (p < 0.001) r = 0.628 (p < 0.001) 
Gender 211 r = -0.072 (p = 0.295) r = 0.026 (p = 0.351) 
 
On the basis of the significant correlations between rumination and depression, 
anxiety, and stress (Table 3) a standard multiple regression model was carried out to assess 
the relative contributions of these variables towards explaining the variance of rumination. 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure that there were no violations of the 
assumptions of normality, linearity, multicollinearity, and homoscedasticity, and that the 
sample size was large enough for the number of predictors being analysed. The model 
explained 22.7% of the variance in rumination (F (3, 261) = 26.494, p < 0.001) with stress 
making the largest unique contribution (beta = 0.248, p < 0.01). Depression (beta = 0.158, P 
< 0.05) and anxiety (beta = 0.154, p < 0.05) were also found to make significant, though 
lesser, contributions. A follow-up model which included gender as a predictor was also run 
but this did not add anything to the explanation of rumination and gender was not found to be 
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a significant contributor (p = 0.269). The addition of gender to the model also did not alter 
the unique contribution that depression made to the explanation of rumination.  
Based on the literature around gender differences in rumination and depression two 
further regressions were performed, one using only the data from female participants and the 
other using only the data from male participants. After checking for violations of the 
assumptions the two regressions were carried out using the same variables as the whole 
sample regression. The model of the female data was found to explain 24.9% of the variance 
in rumination (F (3, 153) = 17.93, P < 0.001) with depression (beta = 0.243, p < 0.05) and 
stress (beta = 0.280, p < 0.05) making significant unique contributions. Anxiety did not make 
a significant contribution to this model (p = 0.565). The model of the male data found that 
depression, anxiety, and stress explained slightly less of the variance in rumination with 
22.2% (F (3, 56) = 6.338, p = 0.01). Interestingly, the only variable to make a significant 
contribution was anxiety (beta = 0.448, p < 0.05), the opposite result to that found in the 
female model. The above results suggest that depression, anxiety, and stress contribute to the 
explanation of rumination but that their relative contributions may differ between the 
genders, although this possible gender difference was not tested statistically.  
3.4 Rumination, Gender, and Depression 
 A hierarchical multiple regression was used to assess the ability of rumination to 
predict levels of depression after controlling for the influence of gender. Preliminary analyses 
were again conducted and no violations were found. Gender was entered into the hierarchical 
regression at Step 1 and was not found to explain any of the variance in depression (R square 
= 0.001, F (1, 209) = 0.143, p = 0.706). Rumination was entered at Step 2 and was found to 
explain an additional 15.7% of the variance in depression after controlling for gender (R 
square change = 0.157, F change (1, 208) = 38.716, p < 0.001). In this model rumination 
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made the only significant contribution to the explanation of depression (beta = 0.397, p < 
0.001), gender was not found to make a significant contribution (p = 0.390). These models 
suggest that for this sample gender did not predict level of depression, nor did it mediate the 
relationship between rumination and depression. A result that is perhaps not surprising given 
that t-tests indicated no gender differences in either rumination or depression.  
Based on the significant correlations between depression and anxiety and stress 
(Table 3) a third step was added into the regression in which anxiety and stress were input as 
predictors. This third model explained an additional 26.8% of the variance in depression, 
after controlling of gender and rumination (R square change = 0.268, F change (2, 206) = 
47.918, p < 0.001). This final model explained 41.4 % of the variance of depression (F (4, 
206) = 38.07, p < 0.001) with stress again making the largest unique contribution to the 
explanation of depression (beta = 0.476, p < 0.001), followed by anxiety (beta = 0.147, p < 
0.05) and rumination (beta = 0.123, p < 0.05). Gender once again did not make a significant 
contribution (p = 0.311). 
Again, based on the literature around gender differences two further regressions, split 
by gender, were carried out using the same variables as the hierarchical regression. The 
female data regression explained 45.1% of the variances in depression with stress (beta = 
0.459, p < 0.001) and rumination (beta = 0.181, P < 0.05) both making significant unique 
contributions. The male data regressions explained 49.9% of the variance in depression with 
only stress making a significant contribution (beta = 0.574, p < 0.001).  These results suggest 
that the predictors of depression may also differ slightly between the genders, however again 




 As the data will be split into ruminators and non-ruminators in order to assess the 
negative priming results in part II, the survey data was also split to explore any differences 
that may exist. The data was split using Visual Binning, a method of identifying suitable cut-
off points based on percentages. The data was split into seven groups based on rumination 
scores with the bottom three being combined to form the non-ruminator group and the top 
three being combined to form the ruminator group, leaving a gap between the two groups. 
The non-ruminator group had ruminations scores that ranged between 1.17 and 3.42 and 
consisted of 96 participants. The ruminator group had scores ranging between 3.58 and 5.00 
and consisted of 115 participants. The descriptive statistics of the two group’s survey results 
are presented in Table 4 for the non-ruminator group and Table 5 for the ruminator group. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for non-ruminator group 
Variable N Mean SD 
Rumination 96 2.64 0.59 
Reflection 117 3.29 0.72 
Depression 96 3.53 4.57 
Anxiety 96 2.93 3.74 
Stress 96 6.83 5.69 





Table 5: Descriptive statistics for ruminator group 
Variable N Mean SD 
Rumination 115 4.11 0.39 
Reflection 140 3.36 0.76 
Depression 115 9.08 0.82 
Anxiety 115 6.84 5.35 
Stress 115 12.93 7.29 
Age 115 23.71 5.97 
 
 The distributions of the two groups on the rumination, depression, anxiety, and stress 
scores, and all selected demographic variables are presented in Appendix F. The skewness 
and kurtosis values for those variables are presented in Appendix G. As the distributions and 
skewness and kurtosis values revealed that most of the variables were non-normally 
distributed non-parametric tests were used to evaluate any group differences between 
ruminators, and non-ruminators, specifically the Mann Whitney-U test of significance.  
Testing revealed that the two groups differed significantly on rumination (U = 0.000, 
z = -13.928, p < 0.001), the result was in the expected direction and produced a large effect (r 
= 0.86). The two groups also differed significantly on depression (U = 4469.00, z = -6.592, p 
< 0.001), anxiety (U = 4467.00, z = -6.604, p < 0.001), and stress (U = 4205.00, z = -7.009, p 
< 0.001), with the ruminator group showing significantly higher scores as indicated by the 
higher medians for that group (Table 6), all three differences produced a medium effect (r = 
0.41, 0.41, and 0.43 respectively). The two groups did not differ significantly on age (p = 
0.345) or on level of reflection (p = 0.499) and the proportion of males to females was the 
same in each group (p = 1.000). These results indicate that rumination is associated with 
higher levels of depression, anxiety, and stress. 
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Table 6: Median depression, anxiety, and stress scores for the ruminator and non-ruminator 
groups 
Group Depression Anxiety Stress 
Non-ruminator 2.00 2.00 6.00 





CHAPTER 4: METHOD II – NEGATIVE PRIMING 
4.1 Participants 
Participants were recruited from among those Part I participants who consented to be 
contacted for further participation via email or text, depending on the preference of the 
participant. This resulted in 90 participants (23 male; 67 female) with an average age of 24.70 
(SD = 6.45). The participants were given a $10 shopping mall voucher as an incentive to take 
part and informed consent was obtained for each participant before beginning the experiment 
(Appendix H). This part of the study was also approved by the University of Canterbury 
Human Ethics Committee (Appendix A).   
4.2 Inclusion Criteria 
 As part of the criteria, participants were required to have depression scores within the 
normal to mild range on the DASS (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1993) so that any results found 
could be attributed to rumination and not to underlying depression. Participants were also 
required to have English as their first language to ensure that they would have a large enough 
vocabulary to recognise the majority of the stimuli and minimise the number of errors. Those 
who had depression scores in the moderate and above range and those who did not speak 
English as a first language were excluded from recruitment.  
4.3 Measures 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales – Depression scale (DASS-D)(Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1993). As the DASS is a measure of current symptoms occurring within the past 
week, and as the delay between the participants filling out the online surveys and completing 
the experiment was often more than a week, the depression scale of the DASS was re-
administered to the participants to ensure that their current level of depression was still in the 
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normal to mild range. The rumination scale was not re-administered as it is a trait measure 
whose validity is not time-limited.  
4.4 Stimuli 
The stimuli for Part II were selected from the Affective Norms of English Words 
(ANEW), a standardised set of affective words, developed at the Centre for the Study of 
Emotion and Attention (CSEA) at the University of Florida (Bradley & Lang, 2010). The 
ANEW gives the pleasure (affect; happy versus unhappy), arousal (excited versus calm), and 
dominance (controlled versus in-control) ratings of almost 2500 English words (Bradley & 
Lang, 2010). From this list 1688 words were selected for use in the experiment based on their 
length, their arousal rating, and their affective rating. The words selected were required to be 
between three and seven letters long to maximise the participants chances of recognising the 
words and correctly reading them aloud. The words were also required to have an arousal 
rating of less than 7.5 to ensure that participants were not presented with words that they 
might have a strong reaction to. The affective ratings of the words were important as the 
words were split into three main lists based on whether they had a positive, negative, or 
neutral affective rating, with an affective rating of six or more being required for the positive 
list, four or less for the negative list, and between four and six for the neutral word list. Based 
on the above criteria 1232 words were selected for the positive, negative, and neutral word 
lists with 411 words in both the negative and positive word lists and 410 words in the neutral 
list. A further 456 words were selected and were turned into non-word stimuli by switching 
the position of two consonants to create orthographically-legal (pronounceable) non-words. 
Descriptive statistics for the four word lists are provided in Table 7. The positive word list 
had an average valence of 6.76 (0.43) and an average arousal rating of 5.16 (0.61). The 
negative word list average valence was 3.02 (0.63) with an average arousal rating of 5.19 
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(0.82). The average valence of the neutral word list was 5.11 (0.58), with an average arousal 
rating of 5.14 (0.54). There was a statistically significant difference between the affective 
ratings of the three lists (F (2, 1229) = 4709.48, p < 0.001) and post-hoc tests confirmed that 
there was a significant difference between all three of the lists (all p < 0.001). The four lists 
did not differ on arousal rating (F (3, 1684) = 0.177, p = 0.912) or on average word length (F 
(3, 1684) = 0.086, p = 0.968) with the lists having average word lengths of 5.18 (0.93), 5.18 
(1.11), 5.15 (1.05), and 5.16 (1.37), respectively.  
Table 7: Descriptive statistics of word-list stimuli 
Word list N Valence M (SD)  Arousal M (SD) Word Length M (SD) 
Positive  411 6.76 (0.43) 5.16 (0.61) 5.18 (0.93) 
Negative 411 3.02 (0.63) 5.19 (0.82) 5.18 (1.11) 
Neutral 410 5.11 (0.58) 5.14 (0.54) 5.15 (1.05) 
Non-word 456 N/A 5.17 (1.18) 5.16 (1.37) 
 
During the course of the experiment each individual target and distractor word/non-
word were displayed only once, unless fulfilling the constraints of the ignored repetition 
condition. This was done to eliminate the possibility of familiarity effects and to ensure that 
any results would be true priming, as each word served only one capacity – an ignored 
repetition or an unrelated target.  
4.5 Design and Procedure 
This experiment assessed both short-term and long-term negative priming and had a 
between subjects factor (high or low ruminators) and two within subjects factors (Condition 
type [unrelated control or ignored repetition condition] and Word affect [positive, negative, 
or neutral affective word]). The layout and timing of the experiment was based upon the 
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negative priming protocol used in Experiment 1 of Neumann et al. (1999). In this negative 
priming task a fixation cross was presented for 500ms, the prime display was then presented 
for 200ms, followed by a blank screen presented for one second to give participants time to 
read the prime target aloud, and finally the probe display was presented until the participants 
made a lexical decision, whether the target was a word or not. The start of the next trial was 
signified by the return of the fixation cross. The prime and probe displays both consisted of 
two words, one above the other with the vertical space between the words being 
approximately 0.4° of visual angle apart. Target words were presented in lowercase letters 
and distractor words were presented in uppercase letters with the target words being 
presented on top 50% of the time. Prime displays were presented either centred on the 
computer screen or to the right or left of the centre, with the innermost edge of the stimuli 
about 2.0° of visual angle to the right or left of the centre point, respectively. The positions of 
the prime displays were determined, pseudo-randomly, in equal proportions for right, left, 
and centre. The probe displays were always presented in the centre of the screen. The 
experimental layout for each condition and each affect type is presented in Table 8. The 
whole protocol was designed and run with the E-Prime 2.0 software package and a serial 
mouse was used to accurately record response times, where the left button was clicked when 




Table 8: Experiment Layout for each condition and affect, with display times 


















































































In order to assess both short-term and long-term negative priming the experiment was 
partitioned into three sections, one after the other, with a brief reminder of the instructions 
between each section. Section I consisted of both short-term prime-probe couplets (the prime 
and the probe it is coupled with) and long-term primes, section II consisted of short-term 
prime-probe couplets and also acted as filler trials for the long-term priming condition, and 
section III displayed the long-term target probes as well as having further short-term prime-
probe couplets.  
All three sections followed the same layout and timing and consisted of 144 prime-
probe couplets. In each section, 72 of the trials had word-targets and 72 had non-word targets. 
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For the word-target trials there were four conditions: (1) Short-term Unrelated control 
condition, in which all stimuli in both the prime and probe trials were different; (2) Long-
term Unrelated control condition, which consisted of the unrelated control trials from section 
III; (3) Short-term ignored repetition condition, in which the probe target was the same as the 
prime distractor that immediately preceded it; and (4) Long-term ignored repetition condition, 
in which the probe target (presented in section III) was the same as a prime distractor 
presented in the first section of the experiment. Each condition also had three subtypes of 
words: positive, negative, and neutral affect, based on the affect of the probe target word, 
resulting in 12 trial types of interest. This was done to detect if the affect of the words 
influenced the magnitude of negative priming, and whether these were systematically 
affected by rumination status.  
The words used in the experiment were sorted pseudo-randomly so that there were an 
equal number of positive, negative, and neutral word trials in each condition. The words were 
also sorted pseudo-randomly so that the number of affective words for the prime target and 
prime and probe distractors was also equal. For the prime display participants had to read 
aloud the target word while ignoring the distractor word and for the probe display the 
participants made a lexical decision (word or non-word) response by clicking the left button 
of the serial mouse if the target was a word and the right button if the target was a non-word, 
while ignoring the probe distractor, which was either a word or a non-word. Participants were 
instructed to try to name the lowercase prime word as fast as they could and also make the 
word/non-word decisions as fast as possible, but to try not to make any errors during the 
entire experiment. They were also told that the uppercase words were included to make the 
tasks more difficult and that the better they ignored the uppercase words, the faster and more 
accurately they would be able to name the lowercase words.  Participants completed 24 
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practice trials prior to beginning the first section of the experiment and completed six buffer 
trials at the beginning of each of the three sections.  
The 72 word trials in section I consisted of 36 short-term ignored repetition trials and 
36 unrelated control trials, with 12 positive, negative, and neutral trials in each condition. The 
prime distractors for the 36 unrelated control trials also served as the primes for the long-term 
ignored repetition trials in section III. Section II of the experiment was the same as section I 
except that it did not have any long-term prime words. For section III the 72 word trials 
consisted of 12 unrelated control trials (four positive, four negative, and four neutral) serving 
as control trials for both the short- and the long-term priming, 24 short-term ignored 
repetition trials (eight positive, eight negative, and eight neutral), and the remaining 36 word 
trials were long-term ignored repetition trials (12 positive, 12 negative, and 12 neutral). These 
trials had as targets the 36 prime distractor words from the unrelated control trials in section 
I, creating the standard ignored repetition prime-probe couplets from section I and II except 
that, in this case, the section II trials acted as fillers between the prime and probe displays. 
The probe targets for the long-term ignored repetition trials were presented in the same order 
as they were in section I, i.e. the unrelated control prime distractor from trial number six in 
section I becomes the target for trial number six of section III. This resulted in there 
consistently being 299 intervening trials between the presentation of the long-term primes in 
section I and their presentation as targets in section III, with delay of approximately 18 
minutes. 
In order to establish that effects could be attributed to the negative priming 
manipulation and not to order-effects or the specific words used, two versions of the 
experiment were created. This was done by having the probe targets fulfil a different 
condition in each version, with ignored repetition probe targets becoming unrelated control 
probe targets and unrelated control probe targets becoming ignored repetition probe targets. 
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This results in each probe target word serving as an ignored repetition probe target in one 
version and an unrelated control probe target in the alternate version. Unfortunately, only the 
short-term priming trials were counterbalanced effectively with the long-term trials not being 
adequately counterbalanced to allow for a valid interpretation of the long-term priming 
results. The use of the two versions of the experiment was alternated and half of the 
participants did one version whereas the other half did the other version.  
A catch trial was also inserted at the end of the experiment in which the participant 
was shown a prime display and then had to choose from two options what was the prime 
distractor they had just been shown. This was done in order to ensure that the prime distractor 
was in fact ignored. The correct answer (A or B) was different in the two counterbalanced 
versions of the experiment and three different words were alternated as the prime distractor. 
The position of the three different prime distractors was also alternated (centre, left, or right). 
This created nine different versions of the catch trial for each version of the experiment (18 
versions in total) that were alternated for each participant, i.e. the first and tenth participant 
for each counterbalanced version did the first version of the catch trial, the second and 
eleventh participant did the second version, and so on. The multiple versions of the catch trial 
were created so that a chance level result (fifty percent correct) would indicate that the 
participants were not seeing prime distractor and were therefore guessing the answer.  
4.6 Data Analysis 
The responses to both the prime and probe targets of the word trials were recorded, 
but only trials in which the participant correctly named the prime target and made the correct 
lexical decision were included in the reaction time analysis. Trials with extreme reaction 
times (below 300ms and above 2500ms) were also removed from the analyses in accordance 
with standard procedures (Joormann, 2006). For each participant the median reaction times 
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were calculated for each condition, unrelated control, ignored repetition, long-term unrelated 
control, and long-term ignored repetition. Each condition was then divided into the three 
affects, negative, neutral, and positive.  
Before the results were analysed the participants were split into two groups, non-
ruminators and ruminators. This split was performed using visual binning, in which the data 
was split into seven equal percentage groups based on rumination scores with the bottom 
three being combined to form the non-ruminator group and the top three being combined to 
form the ruminator group, leaving a gap between the two groups. The non-ruminator group 
consisted of 44 participants and had an average rumination level of 2.60 (SD = 0.69). The 
ruminator group consisted of 39 participants and had an average rumination level of 4.06 (SD 
= 0.34).  
The overall results were analysed using dependent means t-tests in which the 
unrelated control condition was directly compared to the ignored repetition condition. To 
analyse group differences, individual difference scores were calculated by subtracting the 
reaction times in the ignored repetition condition from the reactions in the unrelated control 
condition. These groups differences were then analysed using independent means t-tests and 
a one-way repeated measures ANOVA. Differences in affect were examined using both 
dependent and independent means t-tests for the short-term trials only as there were not 
enough long-term trials to analyse the impact of affect on long-term priming. Where 
parametric tests were inappropriate due to violations of normality, as assessed using 
histograms, normality plots, and skewness and kurtosis values, the equivalent non-parametric 
tests were used. For a dependent means t-test the Wilcoxon signed rank test was used instead, 
the Mann-Whitney U test was used instead of an independent means t-test, and a Friedman’s 
test was used instead of the one-way repeated measures ANOVA. Power calculations were 
performed for all analyses in order to correctly identify whether or not differences exist. 
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Where significant results were obtained effect sizes were calculated using η2 in which, 
according to Cohen (1988), 0.01 is a small effect, 0.06 is a medium effect, and 0.138 is a 
large effect. All analyses were carried out using IBM SPSS Statistics 22, except for the power 




CHAPTER 5: RESULTS II – NEGATIVE PRIMING 
5.1 Distribution of Test Variables 
The distributions of the whole sample reaction times for the unrelated control 
condition and the ignored repetition condition are presented in Appendix I for both the short- 
and the long-term priming, as are the whole sample reactions times for the two conditions 
divided by affect and the distributions of the differences between the conditions. The 
skewness and kurtosis values are presented in Appendix J. The distributions for the two 
groups, non-ruminator and ruminator are provided in Appendix K, with the skewness and 
kurtosis data being presented in Appendix L. The distributions and skewness and kurtosis 
data for the error rates are provided in Appendices M and N, respectively. The distribution of 
the whole sample reactions times for the unrelated control condition was approximately 
normal (Figure 1) with a skewness value of 0.367 (Std. error = 0.154) and a kurtosis value of 
-0.533 (Std. error = 0.307). The distribution of the whole sample reaction times for the 
ignored repetition was also approximately normal (Figure 2) with a skewness value of 0.305 
(Std. error = 0.154) and a kurtosis value of -0.425 (Std. error = 0.307). All other reaction 
times variables for both the whole sample and for the non-ruminator and ruminator groups 
were approximately normal. The majority of the error rate variables were not normally 
distributed, with the exception of the distributions of the differences, which were all normally 




Figure 1: Distribution of the whole sample reaction times for the unrelated control condition 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of the whole sample reaction times for the ignored repetition condition 
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5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 Descriptive statistics for the whole sample reaction times are provided in Table 9 for 
both the short- and long-term negative priming trials and in Table 10 for the different affects, 
negative, positive, and neutral.  The descriptive statistics of the difference scores are also 
provided. Overall the unrelated control condition had a mean of 1239.70 (SD = 330.71) and 
the ignored repetition trial had a mean of 1218.30 (SD = 311.53), yielding a mean difference 
of 21.41 (SD = 152.95) indicating a trend towards positive, and not negative, priming. 
Similar means are observed for the long-term trials with the unrelated control condition 
having a mean of 1121.04 (SD = 311.69) and the ignored repetition condition having a mean 
of 1079.51 (313.58), with the difference score for these conditions also indicating a trend 
towards positive priming (M = 41.52; SD = 215.76).  
Table 9: Descriptive statistics for whole sample short-term trials and long-term trials 
Condition N Mean (SD) 
Unrelated control condition (UR) 249 1239.70 (330.71) 
Ignored repetition condition (IR) 249 1218.30 (311.53) 
Difference (UR – IR; DIFF) 249 21.41 (152.95) 
Long-term unrelated control (LT UR) 249 1121.04 (311.69) 
Long-term ignored repetition (LT IR) 249 1079.51 (313.58) 





Table 10: Descriptive statistics for whole sample short-term trials divided by affect 
Affect Condition N Mean (SD) 
Negative trials Unrelated control (UR NEG) 83 1227.70 (323.04) 
Ignored repetition (IR NEG) 83 1211.79 (316.73) 
Difference (NEG DIFF) 83 15.92 (157.78) 
Neutral trials Unrelated control (UR NEU) 83 1276.87 (651.22) 
Ignored repetition (IR NEU) 83 1249.96 (308.77) 
Difference (NEU DIFF) 83 26.92 (163.64) 
Positive trials Unrelated control (UR POS) 83 1214.54 (317.60) 
Ignored repetition (IR POS) 83 1193.15 (310.11) 
Difference (POS DIFF) 83 21.39 (137.92) 
 
Descriptive statistics for the non-ruminator and ruminator groups are provided in 
Table 11. The non-ruminator group had a short-term mean difference of 20.29 (SD = 155.59) 
and a long-term mean difference of 43.13 (SD = 219.94). These mean differences are similar 
to those obtained for the ruminator group, 22.67 (SD = 150.93) in the short-term and 39.71 
(SD = 211.87) in the long-term. These results do not appear to differ much from the means 




Table 11: Descriptive statistics for the non-ruminator and ruminator groups 
Group Condition N Mean (SD) 
Non-ruminator Unrelated control condition (UR) 132 1246.10 (317.86) 
Ignored repetition condition (IR) 132 1225.81 (299.58) 
Difference (UR – IR; DIFF) 132 20.29 (155.59) 
Long-term unrelated control (LT UR) 132 1145.09 (298.10) 
Long-term ignored repetition (LT IR) 132 1101.96 (331.70) 
Long-term difference (LT DIFF) 132 43.13 (219.94) 
Ruminator Unrelated control condition (UR) 117 1232.50 (345.86) 
Ignored repetition condition (IR) 117 1209.83 (325.58) 
Difference (UR – IR; DIFF) 117 22.67 (150.93) 
Long-term unrelated control (LT UR) 117 1093.90 (325.50) 
Long-term ignored repetition (LT IR) 117 1054.19 (291.12) 
Long-term difference (LT DIFF) 117 39.71 (211.87) 
 
5.3 Catch Trial Analysis 
Before the negative priming results were analysed the catch trial responses were 
analysed to see if the proportion of participants who correctly identified the prime distractor 
was significantly different from chance level (50%), which would indicate that participants 
were attending to the words they were instructed to ignore. Of the 83 participants whose 
results were analysed, 40 participants (48.2%) correctly identified the prime distractor and 43 
participants (51.8%) did not. A chi-square goodness-of-fit test indicated that the proportion of 
participants who correctly identified the prime distractor (48.2%) was not significantly 
different from chance level (50%, p = 0.742), suggesting that participants were successfully 
ignoring the prime distractor.  
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5.4 Overall Negative Priming 
 A dependent means t-test was carried out on the whole sample data to see if the 
differences between the unrelated control condition and the ignored repetition condition 
indicated by the means were significant. The results were first analysed to confirm that the 
assumptions of a t-test were upheld, that the distributions of the two variables and their 
difference scores were normally distributed and that the variances were homogenous. The 
results were significant for both the short-term (t (248) = 2.209, p < 0.05) and the long-term 
negative priming trials (t (248) = 3.037, p < 0.01), indicating that instead of negative priming, 
significant positive priming had occurred. The effect sizes of the short-term (η2= 0.019) and 
the long-term (η2= 0.036) priming trials were small and both tests achieved adequate power 
(97.19% and 99.74%, respectively). Further dependent means t-tests were carried out to 
examine differences between the unrelated control and the ignored repetition conditions in 
the short-term trials for the positive, negative, and neutral affects. The assumptions for these 
tests were checked and found to be upheld. No significant differences were found between 
the unrelated control condition and the ignored repetition condition for any of the three 
affects (all t < 1, ns). Power analyses for these three comparisons found that adequate power 
was achieved for the neutral and positive comparisons but not for the negative affect 
comparison, possibly explaining the lack of significant result. A follow-up one-way repeated 
measures ANOVA was carried out to see if there were any significant differences between 
the difference scores for the three affects, after checking that the additional assumption of 
sphericity was not violated. Again, the results were not significant (p = 0.919), however 
power was incredibly low for this comparison making interpretation difficult.  
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5.5 Group Effects 
 Independent means t-tests were carried out to check for group differences in priming 
response in both the short- and the long-term. After checking that the assumptions were not 
violated the t-tests were carried out revealing that there were no significant differences 
between the two groups on the difference scores in either the short- (p = 0.903) or the long-
term trials (p = 0.901), however lack of power may have contributed to this result. Follow-up 
dependent means t-tests revealed that for both groups there was no significant difference 
when comparing the short-term unrelated control and ignored repetition conditions, contrary 
to what was found for the whole sample. Both tests were found to have power ratings of over 
80% indicating that no short-term priming occurred for either group. Again instead of 
significant negative priming, significant positive priming was found for both the non-
ruminator (t (131) = 2.253, P = < 0.05, η2= 0.037) and ruminator groups (t (116) = 2.027, p < 
0.05, η2= 0.034) when the long-term priming trials were examined, with both tests achieving 
over 80% power. An independent means t-test was also carried out to see if there were any 
differences in the priming responses of males and females, the results were not significant for 
both the short- (p = 0.751) and the long-term priming trials (p = 0.074), although only the 
long-term comparison had adequate power. Finally, a two-way ANOVA was carried out to 
examine if there was any interaction between group, non-ruminator and ruminator, and affect, 
negative, neutral, and positive. The data used was normally distributed and the variance was 
homogenous so no assumptions were violated. No significant main effects were found for 
either group (p = 0.903) or affect (p = 0.930) and there was no interaction between valence 
and group (p = 0.429).  
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5.6 Error Rate Analysis 
 Due to a violation of the normality assumption the error rates were examined using 
the non-parametric alternatives of the tests above. The whole sample error rates were 
examined using a Wilcoxon signed rank test, revealing no significant negative priming in the 
short-term (p = 0.069) and significant positive, not negative, priming in the long-term (Z = -
2.438, p < 0.05), a result which produced a small effect size (r = 0.15).  Both tests achieved 
adequate power, with ratings of 98.51% and 99.96% respectively. A Mann-Whitney U test 
was performed to examine any group differences in the error rates, the results of which 
revealed no differences in either the short- or the long-term between the non-ruminators and 
ruminators (p = 0.636 and p = 0.075, respectively) or between males and females (p = 0.323 
and p = 0.154, respectively), follow-up Wilcoxon signed rank tests confirmed this result. 
Unfortunately, the short-term results for group and gender did not achieve adequate power so 
results cannot be properly interpreted. Friedman’s tests were used to examine any effect of 
valence on priming for the short-term trials, the results were not significant (p = 0.177), 
although again adequate power was not obtained. The expected significant negative priming 
was only found when comparing the short-term negative affect unrelated control and ignored 
repetition conditions (Z = -2.446, p < 0.05) with a small effect size (r = 0.27) and a power 
rating of 99.82%. However as this result contradicts the positive priming exhibited by all 
other significant analyses this is likely the result of a speed/accuracy trade off and thus the 




CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
6.1 Summary of findings and Interpretations 
 The current study examined the relationship between rumination and several of its 
associated negative outcomes. In part I of the study the impact of gender on the relationship 
between depression and rumination was examined. The relationship between rumination and 
the associated negative outcomes of depression, anxiety, and stress were also examined. Part 
II examined the relationship between rumination and the well-documented inhibitory deficit 
that is associated with it, through the use of a negative priming paradigm. It also examined 
the efficacy of the negative priming task which used only single presentations of stimuli and 
was not confounded by stimulus-response bindings.  
 Examination of the relationship between rumination and the variables of depression, 
anxiety, and stress found that the three variables were significant predictors of rumination, 
with stress making the largest unique contribution to the explanation of rumination. 
Depression and anxiety still made significant contributions to the explanation of rumination 
but less so than stress. A model which included gender as a predictor did not add the 
explanation of rumination and gender did not make a significant contribution to the model. 
When the model was divided by gender it was discovered that rumination was best predicted 
by different variables for men and women, with depression and stress making the only 
significant contributions for women and anxiety making the only significant contribution for 
men. Comparisons between ruminators and non-ruminators found that ruminators 
experienced significantly higher levels of depression, anxiety, and stress compared with non-
ruminators.  
 Gender also did not significantly contribute to the explanation of depression, nor was 
it found to mediate the relationship between rumination and depression. When the predictors 
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of depression were analysed the results were very similar to those found for rumination with 
stress again making the largest contribution and anxiety and rumination making lesser unique 
contributions. When the predictors were analysed separately for the genders, stress was found 
to significantly predict depression for both males and females. Rumination was only found to 
make a significant contribution to the explanation of depression for females. Anxiety was not 
found to be a significant predictor for either males or females despite it being a significant 
predictor for the whole sample.  
These results obtained for part I of this study are in the line with the hypothesis that 
rumination will be associated with higher levels of depression and anxiety, with these 
variables being both significant predictors of rumination and being more likely to occur in the 
ruminator group. The hypothesis that gender will mediate the relationship between 
rumination and depression however, was not supported. Gender was not a significant 
predictor of either depression or rumination and did not alter the unique level of contribution 
made by rumination in the explanation of depression. Further, there were no gender 
differences in the incidences of any of the variables, including depression and rumination. 
 Despite expectations, the negative priming paradigm used in this study failed to 
produce a significant and interpretable negative priming effect, with those results that were 
both significant and interpretable being indicative of positive priming. This shows that 
instead of the response delay expected when a previously ignored word became the target, 
facilitation of responding occurred.  In the short-term priming trials, significant positive 
priming was found for the whole sample when the response times were analysed. Analysis of 
the influence of word affect on responding found that the magnitude of priming did not 
significantly differ between the three affects for both the response time and the error rate 
analyses. Further, no group differences were found when examining the response times and 
error rates of the non-ruminator and ruminator groups, with no significant priming being 
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found for either group. Significant negative priming also failed to occur in the long-term 
trials with significant positive priming being found for the whole sample with 299 
intervening trials and a delay of 18 minutes, for both the response time and the error rate 
analyses. However, this result cannot be validly interpreted as the long-term trials were not 
fully counterbalanced. Once again, no group differences were found when examining the 
response times and error rates of the non-ruminator and ruminator groups, with equivalent 
levels of positive priming being exhibited for both groups when the response rates were 
analysed.  
The lack of negative priming produced in both the short-term and the long-term trials 
of this study indicate that no inhibition occurred for either the non-ruminator or the ruminator 
group and as such no conclusions can be made regarding differences in the ability to inhibit 
information between non-ruminators and ruminators. The fact that this study produced 
positive priming where it should have produced negative priming indicates that the results 
obtained are likely due to a failure of the method, rather than a lack of inhibition, suggesting 
that the method used in this study was not an effective negative priming paradigm in either 
the short- or the long-term, contrary to our hypotheses. The failure of the negative priming 
effect also makes it difficult to conclude that the observed lack of influence of word affect on 
the magnitude of priming in this study was not also due to a failure of the priming paradigm. 
As a result of this failure of priming, the only conclusion that can be made is that the 
paradigm used in this study was not effective in obtaining a negative priming effect. 
6.2 Relationship of Findings to Previous Research 
 The finding that rumination was associated with higher levels of depression, anxiety, 
and stress adds to the weight of evidence from previous research which has demonstrated the 
relationship between rumination and several negative emotional outcomes including stress, 
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anxiety, and depression (Brosschot et al., 2006; Kuo et al., 2012; Mor & Winquist, 2002; 
Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Watkins, 2008). The fact that rumination was found in this 
study to be predicted by stress, in particular, as well as depression and anxiety, indicates that 
rumination may occur in response to these variables, which fits with the research classifying 
rumination as a coping style (Johnston et al., 2011; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). The 
association of rumination with negative outcomes also provides further evidence that as a 
coping strategy it is maladaptive (Johnston et al., 2011; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). 
The lack of gender differences in the level of rumination or depression and the failure 
of gender to be a significant predictor for them is contrary to the results of several studies that 
found that both ruminators and those with depression are much more likely to be female 
(Johnson & Whisman, 2013; Nolen-Hoeksema & Jackson, 2001; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
1999). The finding that gender did not mediate the relationship between rumination and 
depression is also contrary to research that has found that the gender difference in rumination 
can fully explain the gender difference in depression (Johnson & Whisman, 2013; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Jackson, 2001; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1999). This might simply be a result of 
the particular sample used in this study in which neither depression nor rumination showed 
gender differences, however, as rumination was found to have different predictors for men 
and women this seems to suggest that there may be a gender differences in the factors 
contributing to rumination. It is possible that women utilise rumination when they are 
stressed or depressed and that men utilise rumination when they are anxious, however as 
these possible gender differences were not tested statistically, conclusions cannot be made. 
The lack of negative priming exhibited by the ruminator group in both the short- and 
long-term trials is actually in line with the findings of Joormann (2006), where no negative 
priming effect was found for the ruminator group. However, negative priming was exhibited 
by the non-ruminator group in the Joormann (2006) study, which indicated that the negative 
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priming method used was valid and enabled the conclusion that the group differences were 
the result of an inhibitory deficit for ruminators, whereas our study exhibited no negative 
priming effect and no group differences and thus did not allow conclusions to be drawn. 
The failure of the negative priming effect in this study is surprising considering that 
the method used is based on the negative priming paradigm from Neumann et al. (1999) in 
which significant negative priming was found across two different experiments where stimuli 
were only presented once and the results were not confounded by stimuli-response bindings. 
Studies carried out by DeSchepper and Treisman (1996) and Grison et al. (2005) also showed 
that a negative priming effect could be found with the single presentation of a stimulus. The 
long-term trials of this negative priming paradigm failed to produce significant negative 
priming as well, despite negative priming being found to be quite robust to response delays in 
previous studies (DeSchepper & Treisman, 1996; Grison et al., 2005; Tipper et al., 1991). 
Indeed, significant negative priming has been found with delays of up to a month 
(DeSchepper & Treisman, 1996), a far greater amount of time than our own delay of 
approximately 18 minutes. However, DeSchepper and Treisman (1996) found in their long-
term priming study that only those who produced negative priming in the short-term 
produced it in the long-term so perhaps our lack of long-term negative priming is not 
surprising given it was also not found in the short-term trials. Further, DeSchepper and 
Treisman (1996) found that those who failed to produce negative priming in the short-term 
showed increased facilitation over time, fitting with our findings of significant positive 
priming in the long-term trials.  
All in all, the lack of negative priming and the production of significant positive 
priming is an unexpected result that is counter to several studies that have demonstrated 
significant negative priming in similar contexts. It is possible that the results are due to 
participants being able to identify that in some of the trials the prime distractor became the 
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probe target, a situation which has previously been shown to cause a failure of negative 
priming (Mayr & Buchner, 2007; Moore, 1994). This explanation however, is unlikely as the 
catch trial analysis indicated that the participants were no better than chance level at correctly 
identifying the prime distractor, which suggests that they were successfully ignoring the 
prime distractor and would not have been able to identify that at times the distractor became 
the target. It may be that the explanation of this failure of priming lies in the differences 
between the priming method utilised in this study, which found positive priming, and the 
Neumann et al. (1999) priming method on which it was based, which found significant 
negative priming. The main identifiable difference between the priming method used in the 
Neumann et al. (1999) study and the method used in this study is in the probe distractors. In 
the Neumann et al. (1999) word probe distractors were used for word trials only and non-
word distractors were used for non-word trials only, whereas in this experiment half of the 
probe distractors were words and half were non-words for both the word and the non-word 
trials. The use of both non-word and word distractors for probe trials could result in 
distractors that are more easily distinguishable from the probe target, at least for half of the 
trials. Easily distinguishable probe targets have been found to be associated with a failure of 
negative priming and, in some studies, have been found to result in positive priming (Mayr & 
Buchner, 2007; Moore, 1994).  It is also possible that the distance between the probe 
distractor and the probe target was too great, meaning again that the stimuli may have been 
too easily distinguishable with not enough competition between them. This could possibly 
explain why, contrary to the hypotheses, negative priming failed to occur in the present study, 
and indeed why positive priming occurred, despite it occurring in the negative priming 
paradigm that it was based upon. A further difference between the current study and the 
Neumann et al. (1999) study is in the size of the overall reaction times, with the reaction 
times for our study being approximately 300 ms longer. This suggests that there may have 
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been a further error in the negative priming paradigm or in the way the reaction times were 
recorded.  
6.3 Key Implications of the Current Study 
The results of the current study provide further evidence that rumination is a 
maladaptive coping style that is associated with several negative outcomes. They also seem to 
suggest that the contributing factors of rumination may differ between males and females. 
Further, the results appear to suggest that women ruminate in response to depression and 
stress and men ruminate in response to anxiety. This could possibly be a result of gender 
differences in the experience of distress with women being more likely to both ruminate and 
be depressed.  
The presence of positive and not negative priming in this study further emphasises the 
importance of the probe distractor in studies attempting to measure the negative priming 
effect, indicating that without a probe distractor similar enough to the probe target to provide 
competition the negative priming effect may not occur.  
6.4 Key Limitations and Strengths of the Current Study 
 The analyses performed in part I of this study examined the relationship of rumination 
to only a few differing variables and, as such, only a minority of the variance was accounted 
for in the rather simplistic models of rumination and depression. The analyses were also 
performed with an exclusively student sample in which the average age was less than 25 and 
the majority of the participants were female, limiting the generalizability of the results. 
Further, possible gender differences in the explanation of rumination and depression were not 
adequately tested meaning that conclusions around gender differences could not be made. 
Never the less, this part of the study did have a large sample size and the descriptive statistics 
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and severity categorisations of the variables measured could prove helpful to future 
researchers and clinical workers in New Zealand by providing norms of a New Zealand 
student sample.  
The main limitation for part II is the lack of competition between the probe distractor 
and the probe target as a result of using both word and non-word distractors in the word trials, 
as described above. However, several other limitations may have contributed to the failure of 
priming that occurred. The counterbalancing errors described in the method, in which the 
short-term trials were fully counterbalanced but the long-term trials were not, are another 
major limitation of this study. This error meant that no valid conclusions could be drawn 
from the long-term trials as it is impossible to determine whether any effect found was the 
result of the negative priming effect or the particular words and the order in which they were 
used. It may also be the reason why negative priming failed to occur in the long-term trials 
with order effects possible influencing the reaction times. For some of the finer grained 
analyses for group differences and the impact of word affect there was insufficient power to 
safely make conclusions suggesting that more participants may have been needed in order to 
validly test for group and affect differences. However, of those results that were significant 
the effect sizes were unexpectedly small and the majority of the both significant and not 
significant analyses did have sufficient power indicating that perhaps with an adequate 
priming method the number of participants would have been sufficient. Further, there were 
not enough long-term trials so that the impact of negative, neutral, and positive word affect 
on the magnitude of priming could be analysed.  
While the negative priming paradigm had several limitations, which contributed to the 
failure of priming and the interpretability of the results found, this study appears to be only 
the second attempt at analysing inhibitory deficits of ruminators using a negative priming 
task. It also appears to be the first-time that long-term inhibitory deficits have been measured 
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for ruminators. This experiment also sought to add to the evidence of what parts of the 
negative priming method are necessary for obtaining a negative priming effect.  
6.5 Future Research Directions 
While the current study found that depression, anxiety, and stress significantly 
predicted rumination, a further study which collects data on a wider range of variables could 
help to develop a model that explains significantly more of the variance in rumination and 
may provide clues as to why people develop a ruminative coping style and what might be 
done to help them develop a more adaptive coping style. Likely variables include those that 
have already been found to be associated with rumination, for example binge drinking and 
eating, and self-harm, as well as information around participants thinking styles, coping 
strategies, and their beliefs about rumination. There would also be advantages in recruiting a 
sample with more males and from a wider range of professions, thus making any results 
found more generalizable.  
Understanding the link between rumination and inhibitory deficits is an important 
undertaking due to the evidence that suggests that inhibitory deficits may contribute to the 
negative outcomes associated with rumination. As such, future research which rectifies the 
limitations of the present study would be a valuable undertaking. In future the competition 
between the probe distractors and the probe targets would need to be increased by ensuring 
that only word distractors are used for the word trials and non-word distractors for the non-
word trials. There would also need to be at least four versions of the experiment so that both 
the short- and the long-term trials could be sufficiently counterbalanced and so that any 
results found could be attributed to the negative priming effect. There would also need to be 
more long-term trials so that the impact of affect on the magnitude of priming could be 
analysed in both the short-term and the long-term trials. It might also be useful to increase the 
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number of groups from two to four so as to include depressed ruminators and depressed non-
ruminators, which may help in explaining the relationship between inhibition, rumination, 
and depression. Previous studies examining the relationship between rumination and 
inhibitory deficits have used a range of methods, including set-shifting tasks, directed 
forgetting tasks, and negative priming paradigms. Therefore, a study which examined 
participant’s performances on a range of inhibitory tasks could provide a deeper knowledge 
of inhibitory deficits in ruminators.   
6.6 Conclusions 
 This study provided further evidence that rumination is a maladaptive coping style 
associated with several negative outcomes and also discovered some potential differences in 
the explanation of rumination for males and females. The complete failure of the negative 
priming effect in this study suggests that it may be vital that probe distractors are not easily 
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Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS) 
 
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which indicates how much the 
statement applied to you over the past week. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not 
spend too much time on any statement. 
 
The rating scale is as follows: 
0 Did not apply to me at all 
1 Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time 
2 Applied to me a considerable degree, or a good part of the time 
3 Applied to me very much, or most of the time 
 
1. I found myself getting upset by quite trivial things 0 1 2 3 
2. I was aware of dryness of my mouth 0 1 2 3 
3. I couldn’t seem to experience any positive feeling at all 0 1 2 3 
4. I experienced breathing difficulty (e.g. excessively rapid breathing, 
breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion) 
0 1 2 3 
5. I just couldn’t seem to get going 0 1 2 3 
6. I tended to over-react to situations 0 1 2 3 
7. I had a feeling of shakiness (e.g. legs going to give way) 0 1 2 3 
8. I found it difficult to relax 0 1 2 3 
9. I found myself in situations that made me so anxious I was most relieved 
when they ended 
0 1 2 3 
10. I felt that I had nothing to look forward to 0 1 2 3 
11. I found myself getting upset rather easily 0 1 2 3 
12. I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy 0 1 2 3 
13. I felt sad and depressed 0 1 2 3 
14. I found myself getting inpatient when I was delayed in any way (e.g. lifts, 
traffic lights, being kept waiting) 
0 1 2 3 
15. I had feelings of faintness 0 1 2 3 
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16. I felt that I had lost interest in just about everything 0 1 2 3 
17. I felt I wasn’t worth much as a person 0 1 2 3 
18. I felt that I was rather touchy 0 1 2 3 
19. I perspired noticeably (e.g. hands sweaty) in the absence of high 
temperatures or physical exertion 
0 1 2 3 
20. I felt scared without any good reason 0 1 2 3 
21. I felt that life wasn’t worth while 0 1 2 3 
22. I found it hard to wind down 0 1 2 3 
23. I had difficulty in swallowing 0 1 2 3 
24. I couldn’t seem to get any enjoyment out of the things I did 0 1 2 3 
25. I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical exertion 
(e.g. sense of heart rate increase, heart missing a beat) 
0 1 2 3 
26. I felt down-hearted and blue 0 1 2 3 
27. I found that I was very irritable 0 1 2 3 
28. I felt I was close to panic 0 1 2 3 
29. I found it hard to calm down after something upset me 0 1 2 3 
30. I feared that I would be “thrown” by some trivial but unfamiliar task 0 1 2 3 
31. I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything 0 1 2 3 
32. I found it difficult to tolerate interruptions to what I was doing 0 1 2 3 
33. I was in a state of nervous tension 0 1 2 3 
34. I felt I was pretty worthless 0 1 2 3 
35. I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with what I was 
doing 
0 1 2 3 
36. I felt terrified 0 1 2 3 
37. I could see nothing in the future to be hopeful about 0 1 2 3 
38. I felt that life was meaningless 0 1 2 3 
39. I found myself getting agitated 0 1 2 3 
40. I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make a fool of 
myself 
0 1 2 3 
41. I experienced trembling (e.g. in the hands) 0 1 2 3 






Rumination and Reflection Scale  
Instructions: 
For each of the statements located on the next two pages, please indicate your level of 
agreement or disagreement by circling one of the scale categories to the right of each 












1 2 3 4 5 
 
1. My attention is often focused on aspects of myself I wish I’d stop thinking 
about………………………………………………………………………...1     2     3     4     5 
2. I always seem to be "re-hashing" in my mind recent things I’ve said or 
done………………………………………………………………………....1     2     3     4     5 
3. Sometimes it is hard for me to shut off thoughts about myself……..........1     2     3     4     5 
4. Long after an argument or disagreement is over with, my thoughts keep  
going back to what happened……………………………………………….1     2     3     4     5 
5. I tend to "ruminate" or dwell over things that happen to me for a really  
long time afterward………………………………….……………………...1     2     3     4     5 
6. I don't waste time re-thinking things that are over and done with……….1     2     3     4     5 
7. Often I'm playing back over in my mind how I acted in a past situation.…1    2    3     4     5 
8. I often find myself re-evaluating something I've done……………………1     2     3     4    5 
9. I never ruminate or dwell on myself for very long………………………...1     2     3     4   5 
10. It is easy for me to put unwanted thoughts out of my mind……………...1     2     3     4   5 
11. I often reflect on episodes in my life that I should no longer concern  
myself with………………………………………………………………….1     2     3     4     5 
12. I spend a great deal of time thinking back over my embarrassing or  

















1 2 3 4 5 
 
13. Philosophical or abstract thinking doesn't appeal to me that much…….1     2     3     4     5 
14. I'm not really a meditative type of person……………………………....1     2     3     4     5 
15. I love exploring my "inner" self…………………………………………1     2     3    4     5 
16. My attitudes and feelings about things fascinate me……………………1     2     3     4     5 
17. I don't really care for introspective or self-reflective thinking………….1     2     3     4     5 
18. I love analysing why I do things……………………………………..…1     2     3     4     5 
19. People often say I'm a "deep", introspective type of person……………1     2     3     4     5 
20. I don't care much for self-analysis…………………………………..….1     2     3     4     5 
21. I'm very self-inquisitive by nature……………………………………....1     2     3     4     5 
22. I love to meditate on the nature and meaning of things……………..….1     2     3     4     5 
23. I often love to look at my life in philosophical ways……...……………1     2     3     4     5 







Figure 3: Distribution of rumination scores (N = 262) 
 






















Table 12: Whole sample skewness and kurtosis values 
Variable N Skewness (Std. error) Kurtosis (Std. error) 
Rumination 262 -0.514 (0.150) -0.209 (0.300) 
Depression 272 1.304 (0.148) 1.420 (0.294) 
Anxiety 272 1.010 (0.148) 0.343 (0.294) 















Figure 8: Distribution of Non-ruminators rumination scores (N = 96) 
 
 







Figure 10: Distribution of Non-ruminators anxiety scores (N = 96) 
 
 














































Table 13: Skewness and kurtosis values for non-ruminator and ruminator groups 
Variable Group N Skewness (std. error) Kurtosis (std. error) 
Non-ruminator Rumination 96 -0.528 (0.246) -0.606 (0.488) 
Depression 96 2.483 (0.246) 7.554 (0.488) 
 Anxiety 96 2.080 (0.246) 5.334 (0.488) 
Stress 96 1.205 (0.246) 1.428 (0.488) 
 
Ruminator 
Age 96 2.670 (0.246) 8.641 (0.488) 
Rumination 115 0.682 (0.226) -0.498 (0.447) 
 Depression 115 1.710 (0.226) 2.988 (0.447) 
Anxiety 115 1.093 (0.226) 1.068 (0.447) 
 Stress 115 0.675 (0.226) 0.396 (0.447) 







Telephone: + 64 3 364 2987 ext. 6166 
Email: caitlin.aberhart@pg.canterbury.ac.nz  
Date: 20
th
 July 2013 
 
Differences in the Short- and Long-Term Negative Priming Effects of Emotional Words 
Information Sheet 
This study is being carried out as part of a thesis project by Caitlin Aberhart in the 
Psychology Department under the supervision of Dr Ewald Neumann and Dr Janet Carter.  
The study looks at differences in the short- and long-term negative priming effects between 
ruminators and non-ruminators using emotional words 
 
Before deciding whether or not to take part, please read the information below, which 
outlines the tasks, and feel free to ask questions about anything you do not understand: 
  
- Complete a short questionnaire 
- Say a range of words aloud while ignoring another word that is present 
- Make word/non-word decisions about one item while ignoring another 
- This task will take around 40 minutes 
 
Please note that your participation in this study is optional and that you withdraw out at any 
time, without penalty. If you withdraw your data will be removed from the study.  
  
All the data collected for this study is confidential and will remain anonymous in any 
publications. All the data from this study will be securely stored in locked cabinets for five 
years following the study. It will then be destroyed.  
 
The results of this study will be published as part of a Master’s Thesis and you may receive a 
summary of these results if you choose. 
 
This proposal has been reviewed and approved by the Department of Psychology, University 
of Canterbury and the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee Low Risk 
Approval process 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about this study please feel free to contact Caitlin 
Aberhart at the email address above. You may also contact Dr Ewald Neumann 
(ewald.neumann@canterbury.ac.nz), Dr Janet Carter (janet.carter@canterbury.ac.nz), or the 
human ethics committee (human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz) if you have a complaint.  
 
If you feel that depression may be a problem for you please contact your General Practitioner 
(GP) or the student health centre (03 364 2402) 
 
If you agree to take part, please fill out the attached form and return it to me before the start 
of the study. 
 











Differences in the Short- and Long-Term Negative Priming Effects of Emotional Words 
Consent Form  
I have been given a full explanation of this project and have been given an opportunity to ask 
questions. 
 
I understand what will be required of me if I agree to take part in this project. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw at any stage without 
penalty. 
 
I understand that any information I provide will be kept confidential to the researcher and that 
any published or reported results will not identify me. 
 
I understand that all data collected for this study will be kept in locked and secure facilities at 
the University of Canterbury and will be destroyed after five years. 
 
I understand that I can request a report on the findings of this study. I have provided my 
email details below for this purpose. 
 
I understand that if I require further information I can contact the researcher, Caitlin 
Aberhart. If I have any complaints, I can contact Ewald Neumann or the Chair of the 
University of Canterbury Educational Research Human Ethics Committee. 
 
This proposal has been reviewed and approved by the Department of Psychology, University 












Email address (optional): ___________________________________ 
 
 



















Figure 22: Distribution of the differences in response time between the unrelated control 
condition and the ignored repetition condition (DIFF) 
 
 
Figure 23: Distribution of the whole sample response times for the long-term unrelated 






Figure 24: Distribution of the whole sample response times for the long-term ignored 
repetition condition (LT IR) 
 
 
Figure 25: Distribution of the differences in response time between the long-term unrelated 




Figure 26: Distribution of the whole sample response times for the negative affect unrelated 
control trials (UR NEG) 
 
Figure 27: Distribution of the whole sample response times for the negative affect ignored 






Figure 28: Distribution of the whole sample response times for the difference between the 




Figure 29: Distribution of the whole sample response times for the neutral affect unrelated 





Figure 30: Distribution of the whole sample response times for the neutral affect ignored 




Figure 31: Distribution of the whole sample response times for the difference between the 







Figure 32: Distribution of the whole sample response times for the positive affect unrelated 
control trials (UR POS) 
 
 
Figure 33: Distribution of the whole sample response times for the positive affect ignored 






Figure 34: Distribution of the whole sample response times for the difference between the 






Table 14: Whole sample skewness and kurtosis values  
Condition N Skewness 
 (Std. error) 
Kurtosis  
(Std. error) 
Unrelated control 249 0.367 (0.154) -0.533 (0.307) 
Ignored repetition 249 0.305 (0.154) -0.425 (0.307) 
Difference 249 0.583 (0.154) 1.242 (0.307) 
Long-term unrelated 249 0.679 (0.154) 0.497 (0.307) 
Long-term ignored repetition 249 0.972 (0.154) 1.427 (0.307) 
Long-term difference 249 -0.283 (0.154) 4.277 (0.307) 
Unrelated negative 83 0.415 (0.264) -0.345 (0.523) 
Ignored repetition negative 83 0.365 (0.264) -0.382 (0.523) 
Negative difference 83 0.751 (0.264) 1.542 (0.523) 
Unrelated neutral 83 0.359 (0.264) -0.619 (0.523) 
Ignored repetition neutral 83 0.238 (0.264) -0.388 (0.523) 
Neutral difference 83 0.634 (0.264) 1.574 (0.523) 
Unrelated positive 83 0.275 (0.264) -0.694 (0.523) 
Ignored repetition positive 83 0.331 (0.264) -0.469 (0.523) 








Figure 35: Distribution of the unrelated control condition for the non-ruminator group 
 
 






Figure 37: Distribution of the difference between the unrelated control condition and the 
ignored repetition condition for the non-ruminator group 
 
 









Figure 40: Distribution of the difference between the long-term unrelated control condition 

















Figure 43: Distribution of the difference between the unrelated control condition and the 













Figure 46: Distribution of the difference between the long-term unrelated control condition 





Table 15: Skewness and kurtosis values for non-ruminator and ruminator groups 
Group Condition N Skewness 
 (Std. error) 
Kurtosis  
(Std. error) 
Non-ruminator Unrelated 132 0.166 (0.211) -0.823 (0.419) 
Ignored repetition 132 0.082 (0.211) -0.767 (0.419) 
Difference 132 0.772 (0.211) 1.881 (0.419) 
Long-term unrelated 132 0.452 (0.211) -0.168 (0.419) 
Long-term ignored repetition 132 1.069 (0.211) 1.807 (0.419) 
Long-term difference 132 -1.000 (0.211) 4.984 (0.419) 
Ruminator Unrelated 117 0.557 (0.224) -0.269 (0.444) 
Ignored repetition 117 0.516 (0.224) -0.153 (0.444) 
Difference 117 0.360 (0.224) 0.551 (0.444) 
Long-term unrelated 117 0.935 (0.224) 1.257 (0.444) 
Long-term ignored repetition 117 0.752 (0.224) 0.385 (0.444) 








Figure 47: Distribution of the whole sample error rates for the unrelated control condition 
 
 




Figure 49: Distribution of the difference in error rates between the unrelated control condition 
















Figure 52: Distribution of the difference in error rates between the long-term unrelated 





Table 16: Skewness and kurtosis values for error rates 
Variable N Skewness (Std. error) Kurtosis (Std. error) 
Error unrelated control 249 1.529 (0.154) 3.519 (0.307) 
Error ignored repetition 249 1.547 (0.154) 2.587 (0.307) 
Error difference 249 -0.333 (0.154) 0.318 (0.307) 
Error long-term unrelated control 249 1.549 (0.154) 3.219 (0.307) 
Error long-term ignored repetition 249 1.783 (0.154) 4.435 (0.307) 
Error long-term difference 249 -0.059 (0.154) 0.103 (0.307) 
 
 
